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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
APPOINTMENT OF COPYRIGHT ROYALTY
JUDGES BY THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS
UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
John P. Strohm"
In 2006, under the power of a 2004 amendment to the Copyright Act (the
Act),' the Librarian of Congress appointed the Copyright Royalty Board (the
CRB), a panel of three copyright royalty judges to oversee statutory licensing and
related royalty rates. 2 In one of its first major decisions, the CRB, following the
so-called "Web II" proceeding that included as parties major commercial and non-
commercial internet broadcasters (webcasters), established royalty rates for
statutory licenses permitting digital performances of sound recordings.' Although
SoundExchange, a nonprofit performing rights organization charged with
collecting and distributing webcasting royalties to sound recording rights holders,
retained-and has exercised-the right to negotiate reduced rates for specific
webcasters,4 webcasters have argued that the default rates established by the Web
II proceeding are unreasonable and will likely make it difficult or even impossible
for smaller webcasters to continue to play sound recordings.'
Webcasters responded to the Web II rate determination in the courts, filing
suit against the CRB on a variety of theories.6 In one interesting and compelling
* John P. Strohm is an entertainment and intellectual property attorney with the firm of
Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose LLP in Birmingham, Alabama, and an adjunct professor of law
with the Cumberland School of Law and the University of Alabama.
1 17 U.S.C. % 801-805 (2009).
2 Library of Congress, Copyright Royalty Board, http://www.loc.gov/crb/background (last
visited Nov. 5, 2009).
3 In the Matter of Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings,
U.S. Copyright RoyaltyJuges, No. 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Apr. 23,2007), availabk athttp://www.loc.
gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1 /final-rates-terms2005-1.pdf.
4 See SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Nov. 5,2009) (stating that
to date SoundExchange has reached agreements regarding royalty rates for sound recordings
through 2015 with SIRIUS-XM, College Broadcasters, Inc., the National Religious Broadcasters
Music License Committee, and National Public Radio).
s Kellen Myers, Note, The RLAA, the DMCA, and the Forgotten Few Webcasters: A Callfor Change
in Digital Copyight Royalties, 61 FED. CoMM. L.J. 431, 433 (2009).
6 See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (rejecting commercial webcasters' objections to the rate determination, which included
that the base rates should have been determined based on a "perfectly competitive market"
standard; judges presumed that major labels would have superior bargaining power than they would
in the actual marketplace, and accordingly provided better terms; and per-performance rates (as
1
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argument pursued in a recent complaint filed against the CRB, commercial
webcaster Live365, Inc. (Live365) alleges that the appointment of the copyright
royalty judges by the Librarian of Congress represents a violation of the
Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution.! The Appointments
Clause provides as follows:
[The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.'
Were the appointment of the CRB by the Librarian of Congress found to
violate the Appointment Clause, the result would bring enormous uncertainty with
regard not only to webcasting royalties discussed in this Article, but also to other
copyright royalties such as cable royalties paid pursuant to statutory licenses,
which have been the subject of extensive proceedings since the appointment of
the CRB.9 Live365 asserts in its complaint that the members of the CRB are
principle officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, or, in the alternative, that the copyright royalty judges are
"inferior officers" under the Appointments Clause, and therefore must be
appointed by a "Head of Department," and that the Librarian of Congress does
not meet the definition of a Head of Department.0
The crux of the inquiry as to whether or not the copyright royalty judges are
"officers" of the United States concerns whether or not the members exercise
"significant authority" pursuant to the laws of the United States." Alternatively,
copyright royalty judges may be classified as employees, performing ministerial
opposed to rates based on a percentage of gross income) are unfair to small webcasters).
' Plaintiffs Motion/Application For Preliminary Injunction, Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty
Board, No. 1:09-cv-01662(RBW) (D.C. D. Sept. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Live365 Complaint]; see also
Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 574 F.3d at 755 (Royalty Logic, Inc., a plaintiff in Intercollegiate Broad Sys.,
filed a supplemental brief arguing that the appointment of the Copyright Royalty Judges violated
the Appointments Clause; however, the court held that Royalty Logic forfeited its claim and
therefore did not address the substance of the argument).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/ (listing pending proceedings before the CRB).
1O Live365 Complaint, supra note 7, 39.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
[Vol. 17:89
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COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES
tasks under the direction of the Librarian of Congress. 12 If it is determined that
the copyright royalty judges are inferior officers of the United States, then a
determination must be made regarding whether the Librarian of Congress is a
"Head of Department," for purposes of the Appointment Clause, including
whether the Library of Congress is a "department.'
13
This Article will focus on the second alternative argument posed by Live365
in its claim for declaratory relief, specifically whether copyright royalty judges are
"inferior officers," and if so whether the Librarian of Congress is a Head of
Department. This Article does not assume that Live365 will necessarily fail under
the first argumnent, pusithig diat cupyiiglht oy a&ty judges at.. piuay o ,fi ers under
the Appointments Clause.
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Court held that special trial judges, appointed to
assist judges of the United States Tax Court, were inferior officers, rather than
employees, of the Tax Court. 4 Although the special trial judges did not have
authority to enter a final decision, the office of the special trial judge is established
by law and the duties, salary, and means of appointment for the office are
established by statute."5 Furthermore, the special trial judges "perform more than
ministerial tasks," including among other things taking testimony, conducting
trials, and enforcing compliance with discovery orders. 6 The Court made clear
that the fact that special trial judges sometimes perform ministerial tasks does not
affect its determination that they are inferior officers.'"
Under the Court's reasoning in Freytag, the copyright royalty judges should also
be regarded as inferior officers of the United States. Copyright royalty judges are
also established by law and appointed pursuant to federal law.'8 The duties, salary,
and term are established by the Act.'9 In addition to having authority pursuant to
the Act to independently set compulsory royalty rates, the CRB can make "any
necessary procedural or evidentiary rulings."20 The Chief Copyright RoyaltyJudge
must have, in addition to seven years of legal experience, at least five years of
experience in adjudications, arbitrations, or court trials.2'
In contrast to the special trial judges analyzed under Fretag the copyright
royalty judges are entirely independent, except regarding novel questions of law,
12 See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
13 See id. at 885.
14 Id. at 881.
15 Id
16 Id.
17 Id. at 882.
18 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2006).
19 Id. § 801.
20 Id
21 Id. § 802(a).
2009]
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to which the CRB is required by statute to request an opinion of the Register of
Copyrights. 22 Decisions of the CRB are subject to appeal by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; however, such review by superior
officers should not disqualify the CRB as officers. According to an opinion by the
Department ofJustice's Office of Legal Counsel, the Appointments Clause applies
when the officers have "authority to act in the first instance, whether or not that
act may be subject to direction or review by superior officers."'  Under the
authority of Frytag, the copyright royalty judges of the CRB should, at a minimum,
be regarded as inferior officers under the Appointments Clause.
If, accordingly, the CRB is comprised of inferior officers of the United States
for purposes of the Appointments Clause, then the appointment is only
constitutional if made by the President, the courts of law, or a Head of a
Department. The Appointments Clause falls under Article 2 of the United States
Constitution, setting forth the powers of the executive branch of the U.S.
government. The Library of Congress is not part of the executive branch, but
rather the legislative branch.24 Nevertheless, the Library of Congress is not a
department for purposes of the Appointments Clause pursuant to Freytag.
According to the majority in Freytag,
['Ihe term Department refers only to a part or division of the
executive government, as the Department of State, or of the
Treasury, expressly created and given the name of a department by
Congress. The term head of a Department means the Secretary in
charge of a great division of the executive branch of the
Government, like the State, Treasury, and War, who is a member of
the Cabinet.
25
Justice Scalia states in his concurring opinion that heads of departments
encompass "heads of all agencies immediately below the President in the
organizational structure of the Executive Branch."'26 The term does not refer to
"inferior commissioners and bureau officers. 27
17 U.S.C. § 802(0(1)(B)(i).
Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 21 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel No. 3, 2007 OLC LEXIS 3, 60.
24 SeeJudd v. Billington, 863 F.2d 103, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing 2 U.S.C. 5 171(1)).
25 Fryta, 501 U.S. at 886.
' Id. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia argues that the majority opinion correctly determined
that the trial judges are "inferior officers" pursuant to the Appointments Clause; however, he
disagrees with the conclusion because the Tax Court is a "Court of Law" under the Clause and is
therefore empowered to make the appointment.
27 Id. at 886.
[Vol. 17:89
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The analysis a court must apply, therefore, in considering whether the
appointment of the copyright royalty judges is constitutional, is whether the
Library of Congress is a Cabinet-level -division such as the State Department or
Treasury, or whether it is an "inferior commission or bureau." In his influential
article, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, John Duffy, a professor of
law with George Washington University, applied a similar analysis with regard to
administrative patent judges of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences,
who are appointed by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO).2"
Professor Duffy determined that the PTO is an agency of the United States
within the Department of Commerce, and is therefore "subject to the policy
direction of the Secretary of Commerce."'  Therefore, under Scalia's
Appointments Clause analysis in Freytag, the director of the PTO, technically the
Under Secretary of Commerce, "is not a constitutionally acceptable appointing
authority for officers of the United States.. .. "'
In the 2009 case In re DBC, an appellant patentee challenged the appointment
of two administrative patent judges on a panel that rendered a decision, basing its
argument largely on the analysis presented in Professor Duffy's article.3' The DBC
court declined to hear the Appointments Clause challenge, because the appellant
did not timely raise the challenge, and because of action taken by Congress since
the publication of Duffy'sarticle to provide a legislative solution.32 In its appellate
petition to the Supreme Court, the DBCappellant asserts that, among other errors,
the DBC court erred because any retroactive legislative solution to correct the
Appointments Clause violation at issue requires Supreme Court review.
Retroactive legislation to correct an Appointments Clause violation
undermines its very purpose. The Appointments Clause is to be strictly applied,33
as the Clause is critical in maintaining separation of powers. In the case of
administrative patent judges, a finding that their appointment by the Director of
the PTO was unconstitutional would yield potentially catastrophic results: many
of the decisions since the Director of the PTO began appointing the
administrative patent judges would be rendered invalid. The brief in support of
the DBC appellant notes that courts have previously avoided hearing
Appointments Clause challenges on procedural grounds. In the case of a
challenge to the constitutionality of the appointment of administrative patent
' John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904
(2009).
' Id. at 911.
30 Id.
" 545 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
32 Id. at 1380.
31 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
2009]
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judges, it stands to reason that courts would go to great lengths to avoid rendering
a substantive decision on this apparently very clear issue.
With regard to copyright royalty judges, it is similarly clear that their
appointment by the Librarian of Congress violates the Appointments Clause, as
interpreted in Bucklg and Freytag. It is also apparent that federal courts are not
eager to resolve the substantive issue.' A prospective and retroactive legislative
solution would be convenient; however, a retroactive solution would undermine
the purpose of the Appointments Clause.
The United States District Court recently rejected Live365's prayer for a
temporary injunction to stop all CRB proceedings, including the so-called 'Web
II" proceeding to determine statutory rates for sound recordings through 2015
pending the resolution of the Appointments Clause issue.15 Therefore, it remains
likely that the default rates will be established through 2015 before courts or
Congress address this crucial constitutional issue.
See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 755 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (stating that it was "within [the court's] power" to hear the challenge; however, declining
to hear the challenge on the basis that it was not timely raised). Under Frgytag courts are only
obligated to hear an Appointment Clause challenge that is timely.
35 Order, Live365, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, No. 1:09-cv-01662-RBW (D.C. D. Sept. 28,
2009), available athttp://www.scribd.com/20377680/order-denying-prelimninary-injunction-in-Live
365-v-CRB.
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